论道德无知的两面性

伦理学研究 ›› 2026 (3): 30-37.

论道德无知的两面性

陈常燊

出版日期:2026-05-10 发布日期:2026-06-23
作者简介:陈常燊,山西大学哲学学院教授。
基金资助:
本文系国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“维特根斯坦与寂静主义研究”（21FZXB042）的阶段性成果

On the Dual Nature of Moral Ignorance

Chen Changshen

Online:2026-05-10 Published:2026-06-23

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 作为道德知识论现象的道德无知具有两面性：它时而必要且有益,时而不必要且有害。其必要性或有益性体现为它有助于避免知识型道德困境,进而有助于重新理解道德分歧、道德进步和道德圣人等伦理议题,此时若一味追求道德知识,则会误导我们对道德判断和道德动机的理解。特别是,存在一条从运用型消极道德无知到规则型积极道德知识的迫切性光谱。反过来,其不必要性或有害性体现为,认知偏狭、认知优柔寡断和认知懦弱等认知恶习是道德无知的德性知识论根源,而证言非正义、解释非正义和分配非正义等认知非正义形态是道德无知产生的社会政治后果之一。对“认知恶习→道德无知→认知非正义”因果链条的考察表明,克服认知非正义的一个重要途径是识别并且避免有害的道德无知。由此可见,避免这种道德无知的一个有效途径是识别并且克服相应的认知恶习。

关键词: 道德无知, 道德分歧, 道德知识, 认知恶习, 认知非正义

陈常燊. 论道德无知的两面性[J]. 伦理学研究, 2026(3): 30-37.

Chen Changshen. On the Dual Nature of Moral Ignorance[J]. Studies in Ethics, 2026(3): 30-37.

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