手段抑或目的——关于亚里士多德思虑之对象

伦理学研究 ›› 2017 (3): 77-84.

手段抑或目的——关于亚里士多德思虑之对象

田洁

出版日期:2017-05-10 发布日期:2021-12-23
作者简介:田洁,山东大学哲学与社会发展学院副研究员,哲学博士。田洁,山东大学哲学与社会发展学院副研究员,哲学博士。

Online:2017-05-10 Published:2021-12-23

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 亚里士多德在伦理学中有一个基本的区分,对他而言,欲望是设定目的的,思虑为实现欲望目的而寻求手段或工具。对于这个区分的解释,学界主要有两种不同观点。一种持休谟主义的解读,认为理性是为欲望服务的;另一种持理智主义立场,认为理性思虑不会局限在寻求手段方面,在某种意义上,理性思虑可以设定目的。本文在分析这两种解读各自的合理之处与存在的问题之后,进而考察一种被以上两种解释所忽略的情况,以此尝试提出一种可以兼容两种立场的解读。

田洁. 手段抑或目的——关于亚里士多德思虑之对象[J]. 伦理学研究, 2017(3): 77-84.

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