[1] PARFIT D.Future Generations:Further Problems[J].Philosophy & Public Affairs,1982,11(2). [2] PARFIT D.Reasons and Persons[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,1984. [3] TEMKIN L.Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox[J].Philosophy & Public Affairs,1987,16(2). [4] TEMKIN L.Review:Rethinking the Good[J].Analysis,2014,74(2). [5] TEMKIN L.Rethinking the Good[M].New York:Oxford University Press,2012. [6] NARVESON J.Utilitarianism and New Generations[J].Mind,1967,76(301). [7] RAWLS J.Political Liberalism[M].New York:Columbia University Press,2005. [8] 帕菲特. 理与人[M].王新生,译.上海:上海译文出版社,2016. [9] BROOME J.Weighing Goods[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2004. [10] NORCROSS A.Intransitivity and the Person-Affecting Principle[J].Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,1999,59(3). [11] ROSS J.Rethinking the Person-Affecting Principle[J].Journal of Moral Philosophy,2015,12(4). [12] ROBERTS M A.Temkin’s Essentially Comparative View, Wrongful Life and the Mere Addition Paradox[J].Analysis,2014,74(2). [13] 托马斯·库恩.科学革命的结构[M].金吾伦,胡新和,译.北京:北京大学出版社,2003. [14] RAWLS J.A Theory of Justice[M].Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1971. [15] 阿马蒂亚·森.后果评价与实践理性[M].应奇,编.北京:东方出版社,2006.