神经科学的规范伦理学意义——以约书亚·格林的双重进程理论为例

伦理学研究 ›› 2017 (6): 63-69.

神经科学的规范伦理学意义——以约书亚·格林的双重进程理论为例

蔡蓁

出版日期:2017-11-10 发布日期:2021-12-23
作者简介:蔡蓁,华东师范大学哲学系副教授。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金一般项目“进化论伦理学前沿问题研究”（15BZX097）

Online:2017-11-10 Published:2021-12-23

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 约书亚·格林（Joshua Greene）借助fMRI技术探究人们面对电车难题做出不同的道德判断时大脑的运行特征,提出道德判断的双重进程模型以解释道义论判断和后果主义判断所依赖的不同心理进程,并进而得出：由自动的情感进程优先支持的道义论判断,较之于由有意识的推理进程优先支持的后果主义判断是缺乏可靠性的。虽然格林的神经科学研究对探究规范性问题具有启发意义,但是鉴于其规范性结论的经验性前提和规范性前提都存在重要缺陷,因此尚不足以对后果主义和义务论之争做出实质性的推进。

关键词: 神经科学, 电车难题, 规范性, 双重进程理论

蔡蓁. 神经科学的规范伦理学意义——以约书亚·格林的双重进程理论为例[J]. 伦理学研究, 2017(6): 63-69.

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