义务论与目的论之争:以罗尔斯为中心的批判性考察

伦理学研究 ›› 2013 (3): 67-71.

义务论与目的论之争:以罗尔斯为中心的批判性考察

孙要良

收稿日期:2013-02-07 出版日期:2013-05-10 发布日期:2022-01-05
作者简介:孙要良,中央党校哲学教研部讲师。

Received:2013-02-07 Online:2013-05-10 Published:2022-01-05

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 罗尔斯把义务论与目的论之争转换成正当与善的优先性之争。他认为自由主义理论是义务论的,主张正当优先于善;功利主义是目的论的,主张善优先于正当。罗尔斯错误地以为功利主义只有目的论的形式,并认为它忽略了个人分离性。然而,目的论的功利主义根本没有在罗尔斯的意义上忽略个人分离性,罗尔斯混淆了功利主义的两种形式,从而构造了一种内在不一致的理论杂合体。罗尔斯主张一种弱的善理论,认为完善论和非完善论之间的冲突是正当与善的优先性之争。然而,二者真正的分歧在于善的性质。作为一个完善论者并不需要承诺目的论,作为一个反完善论者也不需要承诺义务论。

关键词: 目的论, 义务论, 功利主义, 个人分离性, 正当, 善

中图分类号:

B82-09

孙要良. 义务论与目的论之争:以罗尔斯为中心的批判性考察[J]. 伦理学研究, 2013(3): 67-71.

参考文献

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[3] Ibid., p. 27.
[4] Scott Gordon, Welfare, Justice and Freedom, New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, p. 40.
[5] 德沃金也做出了义务论形式的和目的论形式的功利主义的类似区分,见,Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1981, 10(3): 244-246.
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[11] Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 4.
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[13] Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, New York: Vintage Press, 1968, first essay.
[14] 密尔有时候就暗示他的功利原则是非道德的,见,A System of Logic, bk. 6, chap. 10, secs. 6-7.
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