当代道德规范性研究中的“行动性”概念

伦理学研究 ›› 2025 (3): 38-46.

当代道德规范性研究中的“行动性”概念

李亚明

出版日期:2025-05-10 发布日期:2025-06-06
作者简介:李亚明,中国社会科学院哲学研究所研究员。
基金资助:
本文系中国社会科学院研究所创新工程研究类项目“中国式现代化进程中的前沿伦理问题研究”（2024ZXCX03）的阶段性成果

The Concept of “Agency” in Contemporary Research of Moral Normativity

Li Yaming

Online:2025-05-10 Published:2025-06-06

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在当代道德规范性研究中,行动性概念得到了最为集中、深入的探讨。各种规范性论证均建构了独特的行动性概念。正是这些不同的行动性概念,在根本上塑造了对道德规范性的不同论证方案。持有相同行动性概念的一类理论,在规范性的论证上体现出相同优势,也面临相似的困难。因此,通过反思每一类理论对道德规范性的论证是否充分,可以反推该类论证对于行动性的理解是否合理。如果道德具有规范性,无论将行动性理解为实现主观目的的能力,还是实现客观目的能力,都将在公共理由的论证上面临相同的困境。将行动性阐释为认可特定的人际关系并据此行动的能力,则能够有效避免这些理论困难,使道德原则和行动理由间的关系得到更充分的说明。

关键词: 行动性, 规范性, 道德地位, 道德理由

李亚明. 当代道德规范性研究中的“行动性”概念[J]. 伦理学研究, 2025(3): 38-46.

Li Yaming. The Concept of “Agency” in Contemporary Research of Moral Normativity[J]. Studies in Ethics, 2025(3): 38-46.

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