中国伦理学会会刊
国家社科基金资助期刊
中文社会科学引文索引(CSSCI)来源期刊
全国中文核心期刊
中国人文社会科学核心期刊

伦理学研究 ›› 2004(4): 91-94.

• 研究生论坛 • 上一篇    下一篇

休谟的同情原则探析

张钦   

  1. 河北师范大学,河北 石家庄 050091
  • 收稿日期:2004-04-06 出版日期:2004-07-10 发布日期:2022-03-18
  • 作者简介:张钦(1967-),女,河北师范大学法政管理学院讲师,在读博士生。

An Analysis on Hume's Sympathy

ZHANG Qin   

  1. College of Law and Politics, Hebei Normal University, Shijiazhuang Hebei 050091 China
  • Received:2004-04-06 Online:2004-07-10 Published:2022-03-18

摘要: 休谟认为同情是人性中强有力的原则,同情在表现形式上是自然的,而同情感的实际内容是人为的。同情是道德区别和道德判断的心理机制,是沟通他的心理学和伦理学的桥梁。但由于同情原则建立在抽象人性论的基础上,休谟调和个体情感的特殊性与道德原则的普遍性的努力不可能成功。

关键词: 休谟, 同情, 心理机制

Abstract: In Hume's views, Sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature. The form of sympathy is natural. The sympathy sense revised by imagination isartificial. It is mechanism of sympathy that distinguish virtue and vice and make judgment. He completed transition from psychology to ethics by virtue of sympathy. Hume didn't succeed in conciliating the particularity of individual sensation and universality of moral principle because of his theory based on abstract human nature.

Key words: Hume, sympathy, psychological mechanism

中图分类号: