[1] Thomas M. Powers. On the moral agency of computers[J].Topoi,2013(32). [2] Donald Davidson.Actions,Reasons and Causes[A].Essays on Actions and Events[C].Oxford:Clarendon Press,2001. [3] David Cole.Thought and Thought Experiments[J].Philosophical Studies:An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition,1984(3). [4] Daniel Dennett.Fast thinking. In:The Intentional Stance[M].Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1987. [5] David Chalmers.The Conscious Mind[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,1996. [6] 孙伟平,戴益斌.关于人工智能主体地位的哲学思考[J].社会科学战线,2018(7). [7] Niklas Toivakainen. Machines and the face of ethics[J].Ethics & Information Technology,2016(18). [8] Luciano Floridi.Information ethics:its nature and scope[A].Jeroen van den Hoven and John Weckert. Moral Philosophy and Information Technology[C].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2007. [9] Philip Brey. Do we have moral duties towards information objects?[J].Ethics & Information Technology,2008(10). [10] 伊曼纽尔·列维纳斯.总体与无限[M].朱刚,译.北京:北京大学出版社,2016. [11] Emmanuel Levinas.Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence[M].Alphonso Lingis,Trans. Pittsburgh,PA:Duquesne University Press,1998. [12] David Gunkel.The Machine Question[M].Cambridge,MA:The MIT Press,2012. [13] Lucas Introna.Ethics and the flesh:Being touched by the otherness of things[A].O.Petursdottir (ed.),Ruin Memories[C].Oxford:Routledge,2014.