时间中立性与人格同一性批判——论帕菲特对实践理性二重性的解决

伦理学研究 ›› 2006 (1): 93-96.

时间中立性与人格同一性批判——论帕菲特对实践理性二重性的解决

陈江进

北京大学哲学系,北京 100871

收稿日期:2005-11-20 出版日期:2006-01-10 发布日期:2022-02-25
作者简介:陈江进(1978－),男,北京大学哲学系西方哲学专业2003级博士生,研究方向为西方道德哲学与政治哲学。

Criticism of Temporal Neutrality and Personal Identity ——On Parfit's Solution to Dualism of Practical Reason

CHEN Jiangjin

The Philosophy Department, Beijing University, Beijing 100871 China

Received:2005-11-20 Online:2006-01-10 Published:2022-02-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 西季威克认为功利主义与利己主义是同样合理的,留下了实践理性二重性的难题。帕菲特分别从时间中立性与人格同一性两个角度对利己主义展开批判,力图消除实践理性二重性,但帕菲特的批判却面临着一些困难。文章认为,解决实践理性二重性的关键不是要证明利己主义是完全错误的,而是要创建正义的社会制度、辩证地处理好个人利益与普遍利益的关系。

关键词: 实践理性二重性, 时间中立性, 人格同一性

Abstract: Sidgwick thought that utilitarianism and egoism were rationally required, and left the dilemma of dualism of practical reason. In order to resolve dualism of practical reason, Parfit criticizes egoism from the point of temporal neutrality and personal identity, but some difficulties that face his criticism. The key for us to resolve dualism of practical reason is to construct the just social system and harmonize individual interest and universal interest, but not to illustrate that egoism is fully wrong.

Key words: dualism of practical reason, temporal neutrality, personal identity

中图分类号:

B82-051

陈江进. 时间中立性与人格同一性批判——论帕菲特对实践理性二重性的解决[J]. 伦理学研究, 2006(1): 93-96.

CHEN Jiangjin. Criticism of Temporal Neutrality and Personal Identity ——On Parfit's Solution to Dualism of Practical Reason[J]. Studies in Ethics, 2006(1): 93-96.

[1]	寇东亮. 作为个人品德的自我认同[J]. 伦理学研究, 2010, 70(2): 62-65.
[2]	陈江进. 试析西季威克在功利主义中的地位——从罗尔斯的评价谈起[J]. 伦理学研究, 2008, 68(4): 91-95.