伦理学研究 ›› 2010(3): 104-108.
• 外国伦理思想 • 上一篇 下一篇
郁乐
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YU Le
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摘要: 论文以摩尔自然主义谬误概念为出发点,指出摩尔对康德道德哲学的批评是不恰当的,并分析了摩尔对康德的误解及其原因;进而提出康德以理性事实概念为基础,解决了关于善与道德法则的关系,并为善的概念之阐明开辟了新的视野;康德的理性事实概念学说超越了从“是”到“应该”规范伦理学的思路,以及自然主义谬误所指出的错误路径,指出“应该”作为定言命令是被给予的而非被推导的,从而为规范伦理学开辟了新的境界。
关键词: 自然主义谬误, 善, 道德法则, 理性事实
Abstract: This paper analyses Moore's criticism on Kant's philosophy of moral from the concept of naturalistic fallacy, points out that his criticism is inappropriate and based on misunderstanding; and then puts forward that Kant solves the problem of relations between good and moral law, and starts a new vision about the explanation of the concept of good. Kant's theory about the fact of reason casts aside the usual thoughts of normative ethics and the misleading path of naturalistic fallacy, and Kant also points out that the ought to proposition is given be pure practical reason, creates a new field of view for the normative ethics.
Key words: naturalistic fallacy, good, moral law, the fact of reason
中图分类号:
B82-02
郁乐. 理性事实与自然主义谬误——兼论摩尔对康德道德哲学的误读[J]. 伦理学研究, 2010(3): 104-108.
YU Le. The fact of reason and the naturalistic fallacy[J]. Studies in Ethics, 2010(3): 104-108.
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